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ONE PROBLEM SOLVED, ANOTHER CREATED?
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S STRUGGLES
WITH FOSTERING COMPETITION IN THE
MARKET FOR PAN-EUROPEAN LICENSES OF
MUSICAL WORKS
Kimberly L. Sweet*
I. INTRODUCTION

This paper analyzes the European Commission's approach to creating
an efficient system for the multi-territorial licensing of musical works. The
Commission has chosen a free market approach to solve this problem and
seeks to introduce competition between collection societies to force those
societies to become more efficient.' However, a free market is not always
the best solution because what is gained in efficiency is lost in equity and
cultural diversity. Specifically, while artistic works are private goods
subject to copyright protection, the promotion of artistic works is public,
and therefore a wholly free market approach is not appropriate.
The best solution to this problem is to establish a single licensing
body with the authority to grant pan-European licenses. This body would
be joined by all of the national collection societies, who would sign over
their rights to license the musical works contained in their repertoires to
this body, thus promoting efficiency. The national collection societies
should continue to maintain their repertoires and police users within their
territories, as these remain functions that are best served on a smaller scale.
This hybrid system ensures that the interests of all artists are supported and
* J.D., University at Buffalo Law School, 2009; M.A., University at Buffalo, 2009; B.A.,
University at Buffalo, 2006. The author would like to thank the GRAMMY Foundation's
Entertainment Law Initiative for encouraging legal scholarship on compelling issues facing the
music industry. Runner-up in The GRAMMY Foundation®'s 1lth Annual Entertainment Law
Initiative Writing Competition.
1. Press Release, Brussels European Commission, Antitrust:
Commission Prohibits
Practices which Prevent European Collecting Societies Offering Choice to Music Authors and
Users
(July
16,
2008)
[hereinafter
FAQ],
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do~reference=MEMO/08/5 11 &format-HTML&.
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that diversity is preserved.
II. REMOVING THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL MONOPOLIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO
FOSTER COMPETITION

In July 2008, the European Commission issued a formal antitrust
decision with the hope of streamlining the process for obtaining usage
licenses to make musical works available throughout Europe.2 The
decision broke up the system that had been in place, in which each
country's collection society offered blanket licenses for the use of all works
(including those within its own repertoire and works contained in all other
collection societies' repertoires, with whom they entered into reciprocal
agreements) within that country's borders. 3 In the digital age, this system
has become outdated and inefficient because online music providers are
forced to negotiate license rights with collection societies on a country by
country basis. 4
A. BackgroundInformation on Collection Societies

Collection societies were first established to allow copyright holders
to enforce their rights over their musical compositions in an efficient
manner.5 At that time, it would have been virtually impossible for each
individual right holder to police every establishment where his or her music
might be played to collect the royalties that were due. 6 Instead, authors
signed their rights in their works over to a collection society; the collection
society would in turn grant blanket licenses to users permitting them to use
all of the songs in their repertoire, perform the necessary policing fumction
of ensuring that users had the proper licenses for any songs they played,
collect royalties for the songs used, and distribute them appropriately
among their members. '
Established in France in 1851, the Societ& des Auteurs, Compositeurs
et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM), was the first European collection

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Buma/Stemra,
Additional
Information,
http://www.bumastemra.nl/enUS/Pers/complaints+against+CISAC.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
5. Neil Conley, The Future of Licensing Music Online: The Role of Collective Rights
Organizations and the Effect of Territoriality, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 409,

414-415 (2008).
6. Id. at 414.
7. Id. at 415.
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society. 8 The United Kingdom (U.K.) later established the Performing
Rights Society (PRS) in 1914. 9 These two collection societies entered into
Europe's first territorial agreement. 10 According to the terms of the
agreement, PRS collected royalties due in the U.K. from the use of songs in
SACEM's repertoire and turned the collected royalties over to SACEM.
SACEM likewise collected royalties due in France from the use of songs in
PRS's repertoire and turned the collected royalties over to PRS. "
Until recently, authors who wanted their rights managed by a
collection society on their behalf were obligated to use the collection
society that existed in their own country within the European Union
(EU). 12 Contracts containing membership clauses existed between
collection societies. 13 These clauses were aimed at preventing authors
from withdrawing their works from their country's collection society and
taking them to another.14 These contracts also contained territorial
restrictions that prevented collection societies from granting licenses to any
users located outside of their national geographic area. 15 As it stood, each
collection society enjoyed a monopoly in its respective region; these
monopolies were perpetuated and enforced by the series of agreements that
existed between the collection societies and their memberships. 16
B. The Limits of TerritorialLicensing Systems

This system, while efficient at its inception, has created numerous
obstacles in the licensing of music in the online arena. At the time the
system of reciprocal agreements and national collection societies was
established, it was impossible to imagine the modern world where access to
anything and everything is at one's fingertips. 17 The evolution of digital
technology exposed the many weaknesses of a territorial-based system and

8. Id. at 442.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Conley, supra note 5, at 442.
12. FAQ, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Dr. Tilman Lueder, Head of Copyright Unit, DG Internal Market and Servs. of the Eur.
Comm'n, Speech at the 14th Fordham Conference on International Intellectual Property Law &
Policy, Working Toward the Next Generation of Copyright Licenses, (Apr. 20-21, 2006)
[hereinafter
Working],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyight/docs/docs/lueder-fordham-2006.pdf.
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necessitated the development of a new system. 18 The territorial licensing
scheme acted as a barrier to entry of modem on-demand delivery systems
throughout the EU. 19
In the changing technological climate, the numerous reciprocal
agreements with their territorial restrictions created a situation in which
online music providers were mired in an environment wrought with legal
uncertainty. 20 Music providers were left with the difficult and expensive
task of obtaining separate licenses for each country in which they wished to
make music available. 21
C. The CISA C Case

RTL Group (RTL), a European broadcaster, brought a complaint
about the territorial licensing system to the European Commission in
2000.22 In its complaint, RTL argued that it should not have to negotiate
license rights for music use in each country in which it broadcasts, but
should instead be able to obtain rights for all of Europe with one license
from one collection society.2 3 In 2003, Music Choice Europe (Music
Choice), a digital music provider, brought another complaint before the
Commission, arguing that the International Confederation of Societies of
Authors and Composers, 24 (CISAC) was in violation of EU competition
law based on its efforts to prevent competition between collection
societies. 25
The Commission opened an investigation into the role and practice of
collection societies following the complaints by RTL and Music Choice. 26
18. Dr. Tilman Lueder, The Next Ten Years in E.U Copyright: Making Markets Work, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 13-24 (2007).

19. Working, supra note 17. As an example of this, Dr. Lueder looks to the launch timeline
of the Apple iTunes music store. In the United States, there was a single launch date of April 28,
2003. In the European Union, however, there was no single launch date. The music store was
launched in the U.K., Germany and France on June 15, 2004; it was launched on October 26,
2004 in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Finland, Austria and
Greece; and it was launched on May 10, 2005 in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Id.
20. Id.
21. Conley, supra note 5, at 445.
22. Press Release, Buma/Stemra, European Commission Decision on RTL/Music Choice
Complaints Against CISAC (July 16, 2008), available at http://www.bumastemra.nl/enus/pers/persberichten/european+commission+Decision+on+rtl+
and+Music+Choice+complaints+against+CISAC.htm (discussing RTL Group's complaint
against the German collection society, GEMA).
23. Id.
24. CISAC is an umbrella organization, to which other collection societies belong.
25. Buma/Stemra, supra note 22.
26. Id.
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Realizing that something had to be done to rid the EU of the cumbersome
adopted a
licenses, the Commission
system of territorial
27 on the management of online rights in October 2005.28
Recommendation
In its Recommendation, the Commission specified that rights-holders
should have a choice as to which collection society they want to sign their
rights to. 29 The Recommendation set out two phases. In the first phase,
there would be competition between the individual collection societies and
any new licensing platform on the basis of efficiency, lower administrative
costs, negotiating skill, and/or clout with commercial users. 3 ° In the
second phase, one to three collection societies or licensing platforms would
emerge as the most efficient, creating an incentive for authors and
publishers to pool their repertoires among only those platforms. 3' The idea
behind the Recommendation was to end up with one to three central EU
licensors, down from the prior system of twenty-five. 32
The Commission next sent a Statement of Objections to CISAC and
the individual collection societies with membership in CISAC to open
formal antitrust proceedings. 33 The Statement of Objections informed the
addressees that certain aspects of the CISAC model contract and the
bilateral contracts between individual collection societies might be
restrictive business practices in violation of the European Community
Treaty. 34
The Commission adopted its formal decision in the CISAC case in
July 2008.35 The decision prohibited collection societies from applying
membership clauses that prevent authors from selecting which collection
society to join or prevent movement from one collection society to
another.36 Further, the decision prohibited the application of territorial
restrictions that prevent a collection society from granting licenses to users

27. Recommendations are not binding on Member States, but instead are often precursors to
binding legislative action that will be taken by the Commission; see Lueder, supra note 18, at 19-

20.
28. Working, supra note 17.

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Press Release, European Commission, Competition: Commission Sends Statement of
Objections to the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC)
at
available
2006),
7,
(Feb.
Members
EEA
Its
and
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/63.
34. Id.
35. FAQ, supra note 1.
36. Id.
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outside of their national region. 37 The Commission found that the
restrictive practices employed by collection societies were in violation of
Treaty and Article 53 of the
Article 81 of the European Community
38
European Economic Area Agreement.
The Commission's decision aims to foster competition between
collection societies with the hope of leading to increased efficiency and
transparency. 39 The decision has two purposes: (1) to grant authors the
opportunity to choose which collection society will manage their
copyrights and (2) to foster cross-border music broadcasting over various
In issuing its
channels by streamlining the process of obtaining licenses.
decision, the Commission has apparently weighed the value of efficiency
against the value of cultural diversity within the field of the arts, with
efficiency prevailing.
D. Does Free and Open Competition Come at Too High a Cost to Cultural
Diversity?

Collection societies have been vocal against the Commission's
approach, arguing that the competition envisioned by the Commission
would be detrimental, rather than beneficial, to artists' interests.4 1
According to a July 2005 press release from the Groupement Europ6en des
Soci~t~s d'Auteurs et Composers (GESAC), artists have developed strong
ties to their local collection society, with which they share trust, proximity
and language.4 2 When the Statement of Objections was issued, there were
There are
twenty-four collection societies in the European Union.
twenty-three official languages in the European Union, along with many
other languages spoken by minority groups throughout the European

37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. FAQ, supra note 1.
41. See generally Press Release, CISAC, CISAC Regrets the European Commission's
Decision Concerning Reciprocal Representation Contracts (July 16, 2008), available at
http://pr.euractiv.com/?q=system/files/COM08_PRDecision _S0_ENOK.pdf.
at
(July
7,
2005),
available
42. Press
Release,
GESAC,

http://www.gesac.org/ENG/NEWS/COMMUNIQUES
DEPRESSE/download/COMMUNIQUESEN_20050707_Collective%20Management%20oP/o20
Copyright.doc.
43. FAQ, supra note 1 (addressed to collection societies located in Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom).
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Economic Area. 44
CISAC, along with twenty-two European member collection societies
have appealed the Commission's July 2008 decision to the Court of First
Instance of the European Commission.45 According to CISAC, the
European collection societies were not in violation of European
competition law.4 6 CISAC and the individual collection societies argue
that artists are best served by a collection society that is close in geographic
proximity. 47 They further argue that introducing competition between
collection societies will cause a "race to the bottom" on royalty value,
which would have a devastating effect on the creativity and diversity of
artists.
To maintain the cultural diversity of Europe, artists who are members
of cultural minorities depend on their local collection societies to act in
their best interests. 49 While free and open competition among collection
societies may very well increase the efficiency of the system as a whole, it
most will come at a cost to artists in cultural or linguistic minorities. 50 The
European Commission is surprisingly naive in its desire to introduce a
completely free market approach to the arts. In doing so, creativity is the
victim.
E. While Musical Works are Private Goods, Music is a Public Good

Certain types of goods are more appropriately considered public
goods than private goods. Free market principles, which are easily applied
to wholly private goods, are not easily applicable to creative works of art,
which have both public and private characteristics. While creative works
are private goods subject to copyright protection, the promotion of the arts
is public in that it enhances the quality of life for the community. The
application of free market principles to the arts results in a homogenized
end-product-as mainstream demand directs artists to conform. In the field
44. Languages
of
the
European
Union,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Languages of the -European-Union (last visited June 29, 2009).
45. Press Release, CISAC, CISAC Appeals the European Commission's Competition
Decision
(Oct.
8,
2008),
available
at
http://www.samro.org.za/uploads/627/CisacAppeal toEuro.. .CompetitionCommissionDeci

sion.pdf.
46. Id. (requesting that Article 3 of the Commission's decision, determining that the twenty
four collection societies engaged in a concerted action violating Article 81 EC and Article 53
EEA, be annulled).
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.; CISAC, supra note 4.1.
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of the arts, this result is antithetical; the arts thrive on diversity and variety.
F. A Free Market System is Not Always the Golden Ticket

Free and open competition, while beneficial to the largest
competitors, comes at a high price to smaller, but no less important,
competitors. For example, consider the National Football League (NFL).
If the NFL operated on a completely free market system, major market
teams, such as the New York Giants, would prosper at the expense of small
market teams, such as the Buffalo Bills. The number of teams in the NFL
would inevitably shrink. Team owners recognized that allowing this free
market effect would not be in the collective best interest, and agreed on a
hybrid system whereby revenues were shared among the teams. For
instance, all licensing rights for team logos and trademarks are signed over
to an umbrella organization, NFL Properties LLC. 51 This entity is
entrusted with granting all licenses to trademarks and logos. 52 The system,
while taking away some of the profits that would otherwise be enjoyed by
the major market teams, ensures diversity in the league through the survival
of small market teams.
In an entirely free market system, bigger collection societies with
large repertoires and more extensive resources, such as those located in the
U.K. or France, will overcome smaller collection societies, such as those
located in the Netherlands or Estonia. Large music publishers have already
begun withdrawing their works from smaller collection societies and
placing them with the larger collection societies.5 3 While mainstream,
Anglo-American style artists in smaller countries may be better off in a
completely free market system, artists that fall into a niche category will
suffer as their small, local collection societies fail. The larger collection
societies in France, the U.K., and Germany will be overly occupied,
tending to the interests of their mainstream, popular artists and failing to act
in the best interests of these niche artists. Diversity is a critical component
of the arts, and steps must be taken to ensure that the creativity of culturally
diverse artists survives the development of a new pan-European licensing
scheme.

51. See Nat'l Football League Props. LLC, Licensing Pre-Qualification Terms and
Conditions, https://www.nfl.info/NFLConsProd/Welcome/cpAgreement.htm (last visited Mar.
31, 2009).

52. See id.
53. Conley, supra note 5, at 455-56 (2008); see also Lueder, supra note 18, at 56-57.
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IN SUPPORT OF A HYBRID APPROACH

The European Commission was undeniably correct in determining
that the territorial licensing system needed to be replaced with a system that
is workable in the digital age. 54 However, the approach that the European
Commission has taken threatens the creativity and diversity of European
artists and may cause a "race to the bottom" on royalty rates to the
detriment of artistic creativity across Europe. Additionally, the European
Commission seemingly ignores the great policing and maintenance
functions served by collection societies, which are functions that are best
served on a localized level.
Thus, the best approach would be one that separates functions-with
the policing of licenses and the maintenance of repertoires remaining on the
local level. This ensures accurate accounting and diversity. For the
licensing function, the European Commission should create a centralized
body, joined by individual collection societies, with the sole responsibility
of granting licenses to users throughout Europe. The individual collection
societies would largely remain in place, representing the interests of their
members and policing users within their territory. However, the rights to
license the works in their repertoires would be signed over to this larger
centralized body, similar to NFL Properties LLC.
Creation of such a system would modernize the pan-European
licensing system and remove barriers to the entry of online music providers
throughout Europe. It would also better protect the interests of all artists,
particularly culturally diverse artists who are best served by local collection
societies. Royalty values would be endangered by the introduction of free
and open competition into an arena in which it does not belong. Therefore,
the system as a whole would run more efficiently because broadcasters and
other music providers would only have to negotiate licenses with one body,
as opposed to many.

54. Working, supra note 17.

